Monday, October 1, 2012

Nature and Source of Rights


  
  It is a normal part of political discourse to speak of rights to this or that, or that some act is a violation of one’s rights.  Like most terms used in normal discount, however, this is one of those words that can mean something different to each speaker.  There are several questions that deserve to be clarified: what are rights, what is their source, and what is the proper role of government vis-à-vis what we call rights?

   In the United States we often begin such discussions with reference to the first ten amendments to our Constitution, known as the Bill of Rights.  Of course others have been added, but these are the best known.  They are “known,” I suppose, but extremely misunderstood at the same time.  For example, the First Amendment reads as follows:  “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech or of the press; or the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.”  The government cannot create an official religion nor restrict its free practice.  What is often overlooked is the nature of the language used in writing the amendment.

   To see that more clearly, look at the language involving the freedom of the press.  The Constitution says that Congress, and by extension any other branch of government, may not abridge its freedom.  One is free to write what one chooses, but what is lacking?  It is that the government, while not having to power to censor what is written, has no affirmative obligation to provide any outlet for opinions or news.  It has been said, quite appropriately, that the Constitution requires freedom of the press if you happen to own a press.   No one, either public or private, has even the slightest obligation under the Constitution to provide any citizen with an outlet to express his opinion.  If I disagree with an editorial opinion in my local paper, I am perfectly free to write a letter expressing my disagreement.  No official at any level may censor my letter or prevent me from mailing it.  The state may take no action of any kind.

   On the other hand, the newspaper publisher has no legal obligation to publish my letter in any form.  The government cannot compel him to publish it in the name of fairness or diversity; he may reject the letter on whatever arbitrary grounds he may choose.  True, it may not be good business sense for a publisher to refuse to print letters with which he disagrees; it might really hurt his paper’s circulation.  That is, however, his decision, not mine, and not the government’s.  It is the same with freedom of religion.  I am free to worship whatever god or gods I may choose, or not to worship any deity at all.  The government simply has no role to play whatsoever.

  There is one possible exception to this rule in the Bill of Rights, and that concerns to right to counsel in any trial in which I am a defendant.  It is not clear that the original intent was that the state could be compelled to provide counsel, merely that the state could not prevent one from obtaining counsel if one wished.  The Supreme Court has held otherwise, and for good reason.  I can only be a defendant in a criminal trial because the government has decided to charge me with a crime.  Since the government has put me in this jeopardy, it must be willing to provide counsel if I cannot afford one.  However, I have no right to publicly paid counsel if I am the either the respondent or the plaintiff in a civil case, or if I wish legal advice on personal or business matters.  I am only entitled if I am the subject of government action.

   Rights that are a result of Court decisions take a similarly negative tone.  Many people erroneously think that, as a result of the decision Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court established a right to an abortion. It did nothing of the sort.  What it said is that the Texas law improperly restricted the plaintiff’s right of privacy, in that the matter of terminating the pregnancy was, in this case, purely between her and her doctor.[1]  If she wished, she was free to terminate the pregnancy by procuring an abortion.  The state was not permitted to interfere in any way.  Note, however, that the Court did not establish the right to an abortion, in that it did not state that the Federal Government, the State of Texas, or any local authority had any obligation to facilitate the action in any manner, other than to step out of the way.  No agency had a Constitutionalobligation to provide an abortion, or provide funding for a private one.  Just like the aphorism about the freedom of the press only applying to those who own one, the only right affirmed is the right to procure one, and nothing else.  Even if a legislature makes a decision to fund abortions for those who cannot afford them, that is a legislative, not a Constitutional, decision.  If at a later date the legislature decides to end such funding, no constitutional rights have been violated in the process.  In short, rights are not what the government is obliged to do for the citizen; they are what the government is forbidden to do to him.

   We do hear a lot of discussion about things like a “right to health care” or a “right to housing.”  Such talk is different from traditional statements about rights because they assert affirmative obligations on the part of the government.  In the face of such claims, we must ask two questions.  Who is obligated to act by such a right, and what is the source of that right?  To begin with the first question, we must remember that collective entities are really no more than descriptions or categories of totally discrete individuals; they do not exist.  How can something that does not really exist, outside of rhetoric, possess responsibilities?  If we have an affirmative right to X, then someone is responsible for providing X, and something that does not exist cannot do so.

   If “X” in this case is health care, then if I assert that I have a right to health care, then I am asserting that the individuals described in that category have the obligation to provide it, or provide the funds to pay for it.  The government has no money except what it takes from the citizens in taxes, so if “it” is going to pay for health care, it has only three ways in which to do so.  The first would be to confiscate the necessary equipment, supplies and labor from those who provide them, but this would be a violation of the Fifth Amendment, which states “nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”  It could raise taxes to pay for it, but that would be no more than demanding that the taxpayers pay for it, which is precisely what they would be doing, each individual one of them.  Lastly, it could stop funding some existing program in order to pay for the new one, but that only postpones the issue of whether or not one taxpayer has an obligation to pay for a service for a second taxpayer.

   Before returning to this point, we need to inquire a little further into the source of such rights, those that are not found in the Constitution, if they exist.  First, if the people are the source of law, they are the source of rights.  This will not be a popular position to take once the consequences are admitted, however, either for those on the left or on the right.  Those on the right often point to the words of the Declaration of Independence, that our rights are “endowed by our Creator.”  Politicians on the left have spoken of natural law as the source of our rights, or of the march of history.  In either case government is only recognizing, or should recognize, rights that properly belong to man as man.  They transcend government.  Admittedly, it is likely that the founders thought along the former lines; the language of the Bill of Rights certainly seems to treat rights as if they transcend whatever government is in power.  Either way, to the true believers of either camp, the idea that rights and law come solely from the people leads to the suspicion that it would be all to easy to abolish our rights if they were no more transcendent that laws governing speed limits on interstate highways.

   In reality, however, what assurance do we ever have that a society will remain free, not lapse into some form of oppression?  We have certainly seen religious states that are free, and religious states that are oppressive.  There are free secular states, and oppressive ones.  Did the belief that our creator endowed us with these rights prevent the passage of Jim Crow laws?  Did the belief in the natural rights of man prevent freedom from degenerating into the Reign of Terror?  Did the belief in the rights of working men and women prevent the establishment of the Gulag and Stalin’s NKVD? These arguments seem to have had no impact upon our ability or willingness to step on our fellow man.

  No, they have not, and they can lead to even worse.  There are two types of oppressive societies.  The first is the expression of pure, simple greed for power or money.  Being the top dog in an autocratic society simply makes it easier to get the power or money you want.  Religious moral beliefs may seem to be elevating, but they have never seemed to prevent this type of oppression.  The second type is far more pernicious, because it actually comes about as a result of moral principles.  It arises when we see those who oppose us, not as being fellow citizens with different goals, but as our enemies who are on the wrong side of history.[2]  The worst oppression always arises when those in power see themselves as fighting on the side of the angels, and those who oppose them as agents of evil.  One can endeavor to convince an opponent, but enemies are to be crushed.

   Can “international law” serve as a source for or foundation of human or civil rights?  Before we can answer that we have to ask, “what is international law?’  Rhetorically the phrase sounds inspiring enough, but perhaps that is precisely the problem.  It is inspiring, but it is also empty.  International law is, in one sense, no more than a euphemism for the way nations have become accustomed to conduct their international business.  The term is descriptive, not prescriptive.  There is no international body that has the authority to legislate.  By its own charter, the United Nations can issue only resolutions, and only those of the Security Council are considered “binding.”  The Security Council is still not sovereign, because any one of the Five Permanent members has the right to veto an action of the Council, and there are no enforcement provisions.  Resolutions from the General Assembly are really no more than opinions, since they are not binding even in theory. 

   Treaties are supposed to be “binding” on their signatories, and our Constitution states that a properly ratified treaty is, along with the Constitution and enacted legislation, the “law of the land.”  That, however, is the point; they are only binding if they are ratified, which in our case must be by the Senate.  If not, they are no more than sheets of paper.  A proposed treaty may have the enthusiastic and popular backing of every other nation in the world, but it is not ratified by our Senate, it is no more than an expression of popular opinion.  The people, through the organs of government, remain sovereign.  Like any other law, a treaty is only a law if the people of the United States say that it is.

   Even if we grant that there are no sources of law of rights other than the citizens themselves, suppose that the people becomes seduced by the promises of “panem et circum,” and demand that the government provide a cradle to grave welfare state.  If they are the source of the law, wouldn’t that then, in fact, be a right?  I concede that point; from a legal point of view it certainly would.[3]  This is why men like Madison labored so diligently to produce a government that would prevent one group of citizens from plundering another simply for their own enrichment.  America might be fortunate in the government is obliged to do for the citizen; they are what the government is forbidden to do t that we could well have the opportunity to witness the economic collapse of the European social welfare experiment.  It is becoming clear how untenable this attempt at statism has become.  If we can delay adopting such policies ourselves until the European collapse is complete, then the voters themselves, who are generally middle of the road and tend to reject extremes of either the right or the left, might refuse to countenance such a system.  They key to this success will be to refuse to compromise on issues that would weaken our system of checks and balances in the name of “democracy.”  If we fail, then the alternative is to learn from our own economic collapse, our own misery.